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In this paper we generalize the concept of a non-transferable utility game by introducing
the concept of a socially structured game. A socially structured game is given by a set of
players, a possibly empty collection of internal organizations on any subset of players, for
any internal organization a set of attainable payoﬀs and a function on the collection of all
internal organizations measuring the power of every player within the internal organization.
Any socially structured game induces a non-transferable utility game. In the derived non-
transferable utility game, all information concerning the dependence of attainable payoﬀs
on the internal organization gets lost. We show this information to be useful for studying
non-emptiness and reﬁnements of the core.
For a socially structured game we generalize the concept of π-balancedness to social
stability and show that a socially stable game has a non-empty socially stable core. In
order to derive this result, we formulate a new intersection theorem that generalizes the
KKM-Shapley intersection theorem. The socially stable core is a subset of the core of
the game. We give an example of a socially structured game that satisﬁes social stability,
whose induced non-transferable utility game therefore has a non-empty core, but does not
satisfy π-balanced for any choice of π.
The usefulness of the new concept is illustrated by some applications and examples.
In particular we deﬁne a socially structured game, whose unique element of the socially
stable core corresponds to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a Cournot duopoly. This places
the paper in the Nash research program, looking for a unifying approach to cooperative
and non-cooperative behavior in which each theory helps to justify and clarify the other.
Key words: Non-transferable utility game, Core, Balancedness, Nash program
JEL-code: C711 Introduction
Many economic situations can be modeled as a non-transferable utility game (NTU-game).
In such a game a set of payoﬀs is assigned to any coalition of players, being a non-empty
subset of the set of all players. A well-known solution concept for cooperative games is
the core, consisting of all payoﬀ vectors that can be attained by the grand coalition and
cannot be improved upon by any coalition. In Bondareva [5] and Shapley [20], the notion
of balancedness has been introduced and it has been shown that a transferable utility
game has a non-empty core if and only if the game is balanced. Scarf [19] has extended
the balancedness condition to games with non-transferable utility and showed that every
balanced NTU-game has a non-empty core. So, for NTU-games balancedness is suﬃcient
but not necessary. Billera [4] has shown that an NTU-game has a non-empty core if
it satisﬁes the condition of π-balancedness. Nevertheless, there exist cooperative games
having a non-empty core and not being π-balanced for any π. Necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for non-emptiness of the core have been given by Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen
[11], and Predtetchinski and Herings [17]. The conditions in the latter paper constitute
a natural generalization of π-balancedness, by allowing π to vary continuously with the
payoﬀs that a coalition can reach, and by allowing π to be multiple-valued. The resulting
condition is labeled Π-balancedness.
In this paper we generalize NTU-games and introduce the concept of a so-called
socially structured game. An NTU-game summarizes the results of mutual cooperation by
members of a coalition by a unique set of attainable payoﬀs. In many economic situations of
interest, however, the players within a coalition may have several possibilities for choosing
an internal organization. For instance, in order to run a ﬁrm, a group of workers has
often multiple possibilities to organize itself, for instance according to diﬀerent hierarchical
structures with diﬀerent numbers of levels and diﬀerent span of controls. Within a chosen
hierarchical structure the internal organization may diﬀer in the distribution of the players
over the positions within the hierarchy.
In general, the admissible internal organizations of a group of players depend on the
speciﬁc application one has in mind. In running a ﬁrm it may be appropriate to choose the
internal organization of a hierarchy, whereas in other situations communication structures
or permutational structures, as studied for TU-games by Myerson [14] and Nowak and
Radzik [16], respectively, might ﬁt better, or ordered structures as studied in van der
Laan, Talman and Yang [12] for NTU-games.
In the usual approach of an NTU-game internal organizations are taken into account
by assigning to any coalition the set of payoﬀ vectors that contains all payoﬀ vectors
attainable within some internal organization of that coalition. According to this approach
all information about the payoﬀ sets for the diﬀerent internal organizations is neglected.
1The concept of a socially structured game exploits this information by allowing that a
payoﬀ set is assigned to any organizational structure within any coalition. The set of
payoﬀs attainable to a group of players does not depend only on the set of players, but
also on the internal organization of the group.
We further assume that to any possible internal organization of any coalition a
power vector is associated, whose components reﬂect the relative strengths of the individual
members of the coalition within the internal organization. Although we present a number
of proposals made in the literature to determine the strength of an individual in a certain
organizational structure, in this paper we will make no attempt to discuss the pros and
cons of the various ways a power vector can be determined. Instead, we will treat the
power vector as exogenously given, and consider its derivation as part of for instance the
sociological literature. This treatment parallels the exogenous treatment of preferences in
the economic literature.
We hold the point of view that the power of an individual within an internal orga-
nization of a coalition matters. If an individual in a certain internal organization has more
power than another individual, then he is assumed to be able to increase his payoﬀ at the
expense of the other individual. This process can only be stopped by a credible threat of
the other individual to leave the internal organization or to reorganize the current group
of individuals. Such a threat is only credible if the deviating individual can guarantee his
new coalition members at least the same payoﬀ as before, and the individual has the power
to enforce the outcome that leads to these payoﬀs.
An obvious question is whether this reﬁned modeling of games can be used to deﬁne
a new solution concept. In this paper we introduce the concept of the socially stable core.
For a payoﬀ vector to be in the socially stable core, there should be neither incentives to
deviate from an economic point of view, nor from a social one. A payoﬀ will be called
economically stable if it is feasible for some admissible organization of the grand coalition
and it is undominated, i.e. there is no subcoalition that can organize itself to give all its
members a higher payoﬀ. Socially motivated deviations do not occur when all individuals
are equally powerful at the proposed payoﬀ. This is formalized by considering the power
vectors of all internal organizations that could realize the payoﬀ. If there is a weighted
sum of these power vectors that gives all individuals the same power, then individuals are
said to be equally powerful at the proposed payoﬀ. Obviously, the socially stable core is a
subset of the core. In general, it is a proper subset of the core and therefore the socially
stable core can be considered as a reﬁnement of the core.
We deﬁne the property of social stability for a socially structured game and refer
to games satisfying this property as socially stable games. It will be shown that a socially
stable game has a non-empty socially stable core. To do so, we formulate an intersection
2theorem on the unit simplex that generalizes the well-known intersection theorem used by
Shapley [20], see also Herings [8], Ichiishi [10], and van der Laan, Talman and Yang [13].
Socially stable games have a non-empty core. We show by an example that so-
cial stability of the socially structured game does not imply that there exists a π-system
such that the induced coalitional game is π-balanced. From this we conclude that more
information on the internal organization not only reﬁnes the core, but also may produce
games for which non-emptiness of the core cannot be established by π-balancedness. Social
stability leads therefore to conditions for the core to be non-empty that are in between
π-balancedness and Π-balancedness.
We demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of the socially stable core by an ex-
ample resembling an unexpected relationship between non-cooperative and cooperative
games. The non-cooperative Cournot quantity competition game between ﬁrms producing
a homogeneous commodity will be reformulated as a socially structured game. The socially
stable core of the game contains a unique element that corresponds to the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of the non-cooperative quantity competition game. We show also that for a
non-cooperative leader-follower game, the Stackelberg equilibrium yields the unique ele-
ment of the socially stable core of that game. For these models the cooperative concept
of socially stable core is sustained by the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium outcome and
reversely. From this viewpoint this paper contributes to the Nash research program, see
for instance Nash [15], looking for a unifying theory in which each approach helps to justify
and clarify the other. A ﬁnal application concerns the case that each internal organization
is represented by a graph whose nodes are the agents and whose edges reﬂect the domi-
nance relations between agents in decision making. For this case we present a number of
proposals in the literature concerning the modeling of the power vectors.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 socially structured games are
introduced as well as the associated solution concept of the socially stable core. In Section
3 a new intersection theorem is presented and it is proven that a socially stable game has
a non-empty socially stable core. In Section 4we provide an example of a socially stable
game, whose induced NTU-game does not satisfy the π-balancedness condition for any
choice of π. Section 5 contains examples and applications and Section 6 concludes.
2 Socially Structured Games
Aumann and Peleg [2] have introduced cooperative non-transferable utility games with a
ﬁnite number of agents as games in which for each coalition of agents a certain subset of
payoﬀ vectors is available on which the coalition can agree. When a coalition agrees on
a payoﬀ vector in the attainable payoﬀ set, then each player of the coalition receives a
3payoﬀ as speciﬁed by this player’s component of the payoﬀ vector. A payoﬀ vector that is
attainable for the grand coalition lies in the core of the game if no coalition can improve
upon this vector, i.e. if there does not exist a coalition and a vector in its payoﬀ set that
makes all players better oﬀ, see Aumann [1].
In this paper we generalize the concept of an NTU-game by allowing for the possi-
bility that a coalition can organize itself in several ways, where every admissible internal
organization of a coalition leads to a payoﬀ set on which the members of the coalition can
agree. The internal organization could be, for example, a structure where one agent is the
leader of the coalition making all decisions, while all other agents of the coalition follow
him, a structure in which all members of the coalition are in an equal position to each other
and decisions are made by a unanimity or majority voting rule, or a hierarchy in which
the agents are ordered on several levels. To any feasible internal organization corresponds
a non-empty set of payoﬀ vectors which the members of the coalition can guarantee them-
selves when this structure applies. We further assume that a power vector is associated to
any admissible internal organization of any coalition. The components of this power vector
reﬂect the relative strengths of the individual members of the coalition within the internal
organization. For example, in a hierarchy the agent at the top of the hierarchy has more
power within the coalition than the other coalition members, whereas within an internal
organization in which the members are in an equal position to each other, all members
have the same power. A socially structured game (SSG) is given by a set of admissible
internal organizations and for any admissible internal organization a non-empty payoﬀ set
and a power vector.
More formally, we assume that there is a ﬁnite set of agents N = {1,...,n}.A n y
coalition S, where S is a non-empty subset of N, is able to choose one of a ﬁnite number of
possible internal organizations. The number of feasible internal organizations for coalition
S is assumed to be ﬁnite and is denoted by mS. We allow the number mS to be zero in
which case there is no way the members of coalition S are able to organize themselves
and generate payoﬀs to all the members of the coalition. For singleton coalitions S = {i},
i ∈ N, we assume that m{i} = 1. The collection of feasible internal organizations of
coalition S is denoted by IS and its elements are denoted by IS
1 ,...,IS
mS. The union over
S of all internal organizations for S is denoted by I.
The payoﬀ sets associated with every internal organization of a coalition are rep-
resented by a mapping v from I to the collection of non-empty subsets of I R
n. For every
S ⊂ N and j =1 ,...,m S,t h es e tv(IS
j ) is assumed to be cylindric with respect to S,
where a non-empty set X ⊂ IR
n is said to be cylindric with respect to S if for any two
vectors x and y in I R
n with xi = yi for all i ∈ S, it holds that x ∈ X implies y ∈ X. When
x ∈ v(IS
j )f o rs o m eIS
j ∈I , this means that if coalition S organizes itself according to IS
j
4the members of the coalition can attain payoﬀs (xi)i∈S for themselves, independent of what
the agents outside S are doing.
We further assume that to any possible internal organization of any coalition a
power vector is associated, whose components reﬂect the relative strengths of the individual
members of the coalition within the internal organization. We will present a number of
proposals made in the literature to determine the power vector. For the purpose of this
paper, the power vector is assumed to be exogenously given. The power of an agent within





+ is the nonnegative orthant of I R
n and 0n is the n-vector of zeros. For I ∈Iand
i =1 ,...,n,t h en u m b e rpi(I) denotes the power of agent i within internal organization
I. We assume that every player outside the coalition on which an internal organization is
deﬁned has zero power, i.e. for every S ⊂ N,a n dj =1 ,...,m S,w eh a v et h a tpi(IS
j )=0
for all i ∈ N \ S. Moreover, we assume that the power of every agent involved in the
internal organization is nonnegative and that at least one of these agents has a positive
power. For every S ⊂ N and j =1 ,...,m S, it holds that pi(IS
j ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S and
￿
i∈S pi(IS
j ) > 0. We now have the following deﬁnition of a socially structured game (SSG).
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Socially Structured Game)
A socially structured game is given by the quadruple Γ=( N,I,v,p).
We are interested in payoﬀ vectors that are socially and economically stable.I fa n
individual in a certain organizational structure has more power than another individual,
then he is assumed to be able to increase his payoﬀ at the expense of the other individual.
Such a payoﬀ is not socially stable. This process can only be stopped by a credible threat
of the other individual to leave the coalition or to reorganize the current coalition. Such a
threat is only credible if the deviating individual can guarantee his coalition members at
least the same payoﬀ as before, and the individual has the power to enforce the outcome
that leads to these payoﬀs. To deﬁne social stability of a payoﬀ vector in an SSG Γ =
(N,I,v,p) more formally, we ﬁrst deﬁne the power cone of a payoﬀ vector. The power
cone of a payoﬀ x is deﬁned by
PC(x)={y ∈ IR
n | y =
￿
{I|x∈v(I)}
λIp(I),λ I ≥ 0f o ra l lI}.
Notice that the power cone of an arbitrary payoﬀ vector in I R
n is indeed a, possibly empty,
cone and is a subset of I R
n
+. The power cone of x is equal to the set of all nonnegative
linear combinations of power vectors of all internal organizations that are able to generate
x. A payoﬀ vector is called socially stable if the vector of ones is contained in its power
cone. Let e denote the n-dimensional vector of ones.
5Deﬁnition 2.2 (Socially Stable Payoﬀ)
For a socially structured game Γ=( N,I,v,p) a payoﬀ vector x ∈ IR
n is socially stable if
PC(x) contains the vector e.
Social stability of a payoﬀ vector x means that nonnegative real numbers or weights can
be assigned to the internal organizations that are able to generate x in such a way that the
weighted total power of every agent is equal to one and therefore the same for every agent.
Sometimes it will be useful to deﬁne social stability of a collection of internal organizations
without reference to a particular payoﬀ vector.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Socially Stable Collection ofI nternal Organizations)
A collection of internal organizations in I, {I1,...,I k},i ssocially stable if the system
of equations
￿k
j=1 λjp(Ij)=e has a nonnegative solution. A socially stable collection of
internal organizations in I is minimal if no subset of it is socially stable.
A socially stable payoﬀ vector is therefore a payoﬀ vector whose components can be
achieved by every element of a socially stable collection of internal organizations for its
members.
A socially stable payoﬀ vector may not be achieved by an internal organization
on the grand coalition. In general, if a payoﬀ vector x can be sustained by an internal
organization on the grand coalition we say that x is feasible.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Feasible Payoﬀ)
For a socially structured game Γ=( N,I,v,p) a payoﬀ vector x ∈ IR
n is feasible if x ∈ v(I)
for some I ∈I N.
Furthermore, social stability of a payoﬀ vector does not imply that payoﬀ improvements
are impossible. A feasible payoﬀ vector upon which improvements are impossible is called
economically stable.
Deﬁnition 2.5 (Economically Stable Payoﬀ)
For a socially structured game Γ=( N,I,v,p) a payoﬀ vector x is economically stable if
x is feasible and there does not exist an I ∈I S for some S ⊂ N and y ∈ v(I) satisfying
yi >x i for all i ∈ S.
Economic stability of a payoﬀ vector x means that it is feasible and that there is no internal
organization of a coalition that can make all members of that coalition better of than in x.
Economic stability is a one-to-one translation of the concept of the core for NTU-games to
SSG’s. We will therefore also refer to the set of all economically stable payoﬀs of an SSG
Γ as the core of Γ.
The set of all socially and economically stable payoﬀ vectors is called the socially
stable core of the game.
6Deﬁnition 2.6 (Socially Stable Core)
The socially stable core of a socially structured game Γ=( N,I,v,p) consists of the set of
socially and economically stable payoﬀ vectors of Γ.
A payoﬀ vector x is an element of the socially stable core if there is an internal organization
of the whole set of agents that is able to generate x (feasibility), there is no internal
organization on a coalition that is able to generate more payoﬀ for its members (economic
stability), and x can be achieved by a socially stable collection of internal organizations
(social stability).
3 Non-emptiness of the Socially Stable Core
In this section we give suﬃcient conditions for the non-emptiness of the socially stable
core of a socially structured game. The most important condition is that the game itself is
socially stable. A socially structured game is called socially stable if every socially stable
payoﬀ vector can be sustained by an internal organization on the grand coalition.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Socially Stable Game)
A socially structured game Γ=( N,I,v,p) is socially stable if any socially stable payoﬀ x
is feasible.
Besides social stability of the game the other conditions for non-emptiness of the socially
stable core are rather standard and more technical. All payoﬀ sets should be comprehensive,
closed and bounded from above. Recall that every payoﬀ set of an internal organization
of a coalition S is cylindric with respect to S and that m{i} =1f o ra l li ∈ N.I n t h e
sequel, the payoﬀ set corresponding to the unique internal organization of the single player
coalition {i}, i ∈ N, is denoted by v(i) and the maximum payoﬀ that agent i can guarantee
himself is given by the real number αi.
Theorem3 .2 (Non-emptiness of the socially stable core)
A socially structured game Γ=( N,I,v,p) has a non-empty socially stable core if
(i) for every S ⊂ N, for every I ∈I S,t h es e t{(xi)i∈S | x ∈ v(I) and xi ≥ αi for all i ∈
S} is bounded,
(ii) for every I ∈I, the set v(I) is closed and comprehensive,
(iii) the game is socially stable.
7Observe that (ii) together with the fact that v(i) is cylindric with respect to {i} for any
i ∈ N implies that v(i)={x ∈ IR
n | xi ≤ αi}.
In order to prove the theorem we ﬁrst give an intersection result on the (n − 1)-







This intersection result is interesting in itself and generalizes the well-known KKM-Shapley
intersection theorem (Shapley [20], see also Herings [8]).
Lemma 3.3
Let I be a ﬁnite collection of internal organizations, p : I→IR
n
+ \{ 0} a power function,
and let {CI|I ∈I}be a collection of closed subsets of ∆ satisfying
(i) ∪I∈ICI =∆ ,
(ii) for every q in the boundary of ∆ it holds that S ⊂{ i ∈ N | qi > 0} when q ∈ CI
for some I ∈I S.
Then there exists a socially stable collection {I1,...,I k} such that ∩k
j=1 CIj  = ∅.
Proof
Without loss of generality we may normalize the power vector function such that
￿N
i=1 pi(I)=
n for every I ∈I .F o rI ∈I, let us deﬁne cI = e − p(I). Let the set Y n be deﬁned by
Y
n =c o n v ( {c
I | I ∈I } ),
where conv(X) denotes the convex hull of a set X ⊂ IR
n.O b s e r v et h a t
￿n
j=1 cI
j =0f o ra l l
I ∈Iand hence
￿n
j=1 yj =0f o ra l ly ∈ Y n. Next, deﬁne the correspondence F :∆→ Y n
by
F(q)=c o n v ( {c
I | q ∈ C
I,I∈I} ),q∈ ∆.
Since the collection of subsets {CI|I ∈I }is a covering of ∆, the set F(q)i sn o n - e m p t y
for all q ∈ ∆. It is easily veriﬁed that, for every q ∈ ∆,F (q) is convex and compact and
that ∪q∈∆ F(q) is bounded. Moreover, since the sets CI, I ∈I , are closed, the mapping
F :∆→ Y n is an upper hemi-continuous mapping from the set ∆ to the collection of
subsets of the set Y n.F u r t h e r ,b o t hs e t s∆a n dY n are non-empty, convex, and compact.
Next, let H be the mapping from Y n to the collection of subsets of ∆ deﬁned by
H(y)={￿ q ∈ ∆ | q
￿y ≤ ￿ q
￿y for every q ∈ ∆},y∈ Y
n.
Clearly, for every y ∈ Y n the set H(y) is non-empty, convex, and compact, and H is
upper hemi-continuous. Hence, the mapping D from the non-empty, convex, compact set
8∆×Y n into the collection of subsets of ∆×Y n deﬁned by D(q,y)=H(y)×F(q)i su p p e r
hemi-continuous and for every (q,y) ∈ ∆ × Y n,t h es e tD(q,y) is non-empty, convex, and
compact. According to Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem, the mapping D has a ﬁxed point
on ∆ × Y n, i.e. there exist q∗ ∈ ∆a n dy∗ ∈ Y n satisfying y∗ ∈ F(q∗)a n dq∗ ∈ H(y∗).
Let α∗ = q∗￿y∗.F r o mq∗ ∈ H(y∗) it follows that q￿y∗ ≤ α∗ for every q ∈ ∆. By
taking q = e(i), where e(i) ∈ ∆ denotes the i-th unit vector, we obtain that y∗
i ≤ α∗,
i =1 ,...,n. Hence,
y∗
i = α∗ if q∗
i > 0,
y∗








i = 0, we obtain also that α∗ ≥ 0.






j =1a n dy∗ =
￿k
j=1 λ∗
jcIj for a collection {I1,...,I k} of k diﬀerent
internal organizations in I such that q∗ ∈ CIj for every j, j =1 ,...,k. Without loss of
generality we assume that λ∗
j > 0f o re v e r yj =1 ,...,k.L e t Sj be the set of agents on
which Ij is an internal organization, i.e. Ij ∈I Sj for j =1 ,...,k. By condition (ii) we
have that q∗
i = 0 implies i  ∈ Sj for every j =1 ,...,k,a n dt h u sc
Ij










i =1> 0i f q
∗
i =0 . (2)
Suppose there exists an index i ∈ N such that q∗
i = 0. Then it follows from the equations
(1) and (2) that y∗
i > 0f o ra l li ∈ N, which contradicts
￿n
i=1 y∗
i = 0. Consequently, for all
i ∈ N,w eh a v et h a tq∗
i > 0 and thus y∗
i = α∗. Together with
￿n
i=1 y∗
i = 0 this proves that











Ij = e − y
∗ = e
and thus the collection {I1,...,I k} is socially stable. Since q∗ ∈∩ k
j=1CIj, this completes
the proof. Q.E.D.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 follows by applying Lemma 3.3.
Proof ofT h eorem3 .2
Without loss of generality we assume that 0n ∈ v(i)f o re v e r yi ∈ N. To apply Lemma
3.3, we deﬁne a collection {CI | I ∈I }satisfying the conditions of the lemma and show
that an intersection point of a collection of socially stable sets induces an element in the
socially stable core of the game. For given M>0a n df o ra n yq ∈ ∆, let the number λq
be given by
λq =m a x {λ ∈ IR |− Mq+ λe ∈∪ I∈I v(I)}.
9Since 0n ∈ v(i) and because of conditions (i) and (ii) of the theorem, λq exists and is
positive for every M>0a n df o ra n yq ∈ ∆. Moreover, following Shapley [20], using
condition (i) of the theorem, the number M>0 can be chosen so large that for every
i ∈ N and q ∈ ∆, qi = 0 implies that i  ∈ S for any S ⊂ N satisfying −Mq+ λqe ∈ v(I)
for some I ∈I S.N o w ,f o rI ∈I , deﬁne
C
I = {q ∈ ∆ |− Mq+ λqe ∈ v(I)}.
Since every v(I), I ∈I , is closed and comprehensive, the collection of sets {CI|I ∈I }is
a family of closed sets covering ∆ and satisﬁes also Condition (ii) of Lemma 3.3. Hence,
there is a socially stable collection {I1,...,I k} of internal organizations in I such that
∩k
j=1 CIj  = ∅.L e tq∗ be a point in this intersection, so q∗ ∈ CIj for j =1 ,...,k. Then the
point x∗ = −Mq∗+λq∗e lies in ∩k
j=1v(Ij), i.e. x∗ is a socially stable payoﬀ vector supported
by the socially stable collection {I1,...,I k}. Since the game is socially stable we have that
x∗ ∈ v(I∗)f o rs o m eI∗ ∈I N, i.e. x∗ is feasible. To prove economic stability, suppose there
exist an internal organization I ∈I S for some S ⊂ N and a payoﬀ vector y ∈ v(I) such
that yi >x ∗
i for all i ∈ S. Since v(I) is comprehensive and cylindric with respect to S,
there is a µ>0 such that x∗+µe ∈ v(I). However, then −Mq∗+(λq∗ +µ)e ∈ v(I), which
contradicts that −Mq∗ + λe  ∈ v(I) for any λ>λ q∗.H e n c e ,x∗ cannot be improved upon
by any internal organization I ∈I , i.e. x∗ is also economically stable. This completes the
proof. Q.E.D.
Since the socially stable core of a socially structured game is a subset of the core of that
game, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4
Let (N,I,v,p) be an SSG satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3.2. Then the core of the
game is non-empty.
We conclude this section with an example to show that the socially stable core of a socially
structured game might be indeed a proper subset of the core.
Example 3.5 Let (N,I,v,p) be a socially structured game with N = {1,2} and m{1,2} =
2. The payoﬀ set mapping v is given by
v(i)={x ∈ IR
2 | xi ≤ 0},i =1 ,2,
v(I
{1,2}
1 )={x ∈ IR
2 | 2x1 + x2 ≤ 3},
v(I
{1,2}
2 )={x ∈ IR
2 | x1 +2 x2 ≤ 3}.
10The power vector function p is given by p(Ii)=e(i), where Ii denotes the unique internal
organization on the singleton coalition {i}, i =1 ,2, p1(I
{1,2}
1 ) >p 2(I
{1,2}





2 ). The core of this game is the union of the two sets {x ∈ IR
2|2x1 + x2 =3 , 0 ≤
x1 ≤ 1} and {x ∈ IR
2|x1+2x2 =3 , 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1}. The socially stable core contains only one
element, the point (1,1). All other points of the core are not socially stable. Notice that
in this game there are four minimal socially stable collections of internal organizations,
namely {I1,I 2}, {I
{1,2}
1 ,I 2}, {I
{1,2}




2 }. Only the last collection
sustains the unique element in the core that is socially stable.
4 Social Stability and π-Balancedness
In this section we consider the relationship between social stability of socially structured
games and π-balancedness of coalitional games, as introduced in Billera [4]. To deﬁne
π-balancedness, for any subset S of the set N = {1,...,n},l e tπS ∈ IR
n
+ be a power vector
satisfying πS
j =0f o rj  ∈ S and πS
i > 0f o ri ∈ S. Then a collection {S1,...,S k} of subsets







Observe that for any π-system {πS | S ⊂ N}, the collection containing only the grand
coalition N is balanced. Further, in case for all S ⊂ N we take πS
i =1f o ra l li ∈ S,
π-balancedness reduces to the well-known balancedness as introduced by Shapley [20].
A coalitional game on N is deﬁned by a payoﬀ set mapping vc : N→2I Rn
, where
N = {S |∅  = S ⊂ N} is the collection of all non-empty subsets of N, assigning to any
S ∈Nan o n - e m p t yp a y o ﬀs e tvc(S) ⊂ IR
n which is cylindric with respect to S.F o r a
given π-system, a coalitional game (N,vc)i sπ-balanced when for any π-balanced collection






When any set vc(S) satisﬁes the conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 3.2, it is well-known
that the coalitional game has a non-empty core when there exists a π-system for which
t h eg a m ei sπ-balanced. Clearly, any π-balanced coalitional game (N,vc) yields a socially
stable game (N,I,v,p)w i t h ,f o ra l lS ⊂ N, mS =1 ,v(IS




i ∈ N. Since {N} is π-balanced, {N} is also socially stable and the socially stable core
and the core coincide.
For a socially structured game (N,I,v,p) we may deﬁne the induced coalitional
game (N,vc) by deﬁning the payoﬀ set mapping function vc on N by
v
c(S)=∪I∈IS v(I), ∅  = S ⊂ N,
11i.e. the induced NTU-game payoﬀ set vc(S) of coalition S ⊂ N is deﬁned to be the union of
all payoﬀ sets assigned to the admissible internal organizations on the coalition S of players.
It is straightforward that the core of this induced coalitional game (N,vc) coincides with
the core of the socially structured game (N,I,v,p).
In the previous section we have seen that the socially structure game has a non-
empty socially stable core, and thus a non-empty core, when the game is socially stable.
Hence, it follows immediately that the induced coalitional game has a non-empty core when
the underlying socially structured game is socially stable. We now show that social stability
of a socially structured game does not necessarily imply that the induced coalitional game
satisﬁes π-balancedness for some π-system. The concept of a socially structured game may
yield for no π-system π-balanced induced coalitional games, but whose core non-emptiness
follows from the social stability of the original game. This is shown in the next example.
Example 4.1 Let (N,I,v,p) be a socially structured game with N = {1,2,3} and m{1,2} =
2, m{1,3} = m{2,3} =0a n dmS = 1 for all other S ⊂ N. The payoﬀ set mapping v is given
by
v(i)={x ∈ IR
3 | xi ≤ 0},i =1 ,2,3,
v(I
{1,2}
1 )={x ∈ IR
3 | 2x1 + x2 ≤ 3},
v(I
{1,2}
2 )={x ∈ IR





1 ) ∩ v(I
{1,2}
2 ).
The power vector function p is given by p(Ii)=e(i), where Ii denotes the unique internal
organization on the singleton coalition {i}, i =1 ,2,3, p(I
{1,2}
1 )=( 2 ,1,0)￿, p(I
{1,2}
2 )=
(1,2,0)￿ and p(IN)=( 1 ,1,1)￿. This socially structured game is socially balanced. To









2 ,I1,I3} and {IN}. For each of these
collections we have that the intersection of the payoﬀ sets of the members of the collection
is a subset of v(IN). For instance,
v(I
{1,2}




,x 2 ≤ 0,x 3 ≤ 0}⊂v(I
N).
Because the game is socially stable, the socially stable core is non-empty. In fact, the
payoﬀ vector (1,1,0)￿ is the unique element in the socially stable core and is also the
unique core element. This payoﬀ vector lies in v(IN) and no coalition can improve upon
this outcome, so it is in the core. Further, there are no other core elements, since the





2 . Finally, this payoﬀ vector is sustained through the





We now consider the induced coalitional game. The payoﬀ set mapping vc of this












and vc(S)=∅ for all other S. Of course, again the payoﬀ vector (1,1,0)￿ is the unique
element in the core of this coalitional game and thus the core is non-empty. However,
there does not exist a π- s y s t e mf o rw h i c ht h eg a m ei sπ-balanced. To show this, ﬁrst let




2 . Then the collection {{1,2}, {3}} is
π-balanced. However, vc({1,2})∩vc(3) is not contained in vc(N), for instance x =( 1
2,2,0)￿





2 . Next, suppose this latter equality does not hold. In this case we assume




2 . Then the collection {{1,2}, {1}, {3}} is
π-balanced. However, the payoﬀ vector x =( 0 ,3,0)￿ is in vc({1,2})∩vc(1)∩vc(3) but not
in vc(N) and again the game is not π-balanced. Hence, there does not exist a π-system for
which the induced coalitional game is π-balanced, so that the non-emptiness of the core
can not be concluded from the π-balancedness condition. This concludes the example.
We conclude this section by considering the socially stable core of a socially struc-
tured game as a subset of the core. For any element x in the socially stable core of a
game Γ, feasibility of x implies that x ∈ v(I)f o rs o m eI ∈I N. Moreover, there exists a
socially stable collection H⊂Isustaining x. We noticed already that that there does not
need to be a socially stable collection of internal organizations on the whole set of agents.
Therefore, H may contain internal organizations of proper subsets of N. Moreover, it
might be that x is sustained by several socially stable collections. Now, let I(x)b et h e
‘supercollection’ containing all internal organizations that can achieve x. This supercollec-
tion contains at least one internal organization of the grand coalition N and typically some
internal organizations on subsets of N. Economic stability implies that improvements are
not possible and therefore x cannot be in the interior of any of these payoﬀ sets. So, we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2 (Boundary property)
For a payoﬀ x i nt h es o c i a l l ys t a b l ec o r eo fΓ, let I(x) be the collection of all internal
organizations I such that x ∈ v(I). Then x is on the boundary of v(I) for all I ∈I(x).
13The corollary says that the socially stable core typically selects payoﬀ vectors in the core,
which are on the boundary of several payoﬀ sets. In general, an element x of the socially
stable core lies in the (relative) interior of the core if I(x) contains only internal organi-
zations on N and x lies in the boundary of the core if I(x) contains at least one internal
organization on a proper subset of agents.
5 Applications and Examples
In this section we consider some applications and examples of socially structured games
and discuss conditions under which the socially stable core is non-empty and how this
set diﬀers from the core itself. First, we consider a duopoly with two proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrms. We model this economic setting as a socially structured game and show that under
rather general conditions its socially stable core contains exactly one element. Depending
on the set of admissible internal organizations, this unique socially stable core element
corresponds to either the Cournot-Nash outcome of duopoly or the Stackelberg solution.
Next we consider socially structured games, in which every internal organization of
a coalition is represented by a directed graph. From the literature several power vector
functions for graphs are known and we will give suﬃcient conditions under which the
socially stable core of a game in graph structure is non-empty. In case there is only (at
most) one graph and corresponding payoﬀ set for any coalition, we consider by means of
some examples how the subset of the core selected by the socially stable core depends on
the graph structure and the corresponding power vector function.
5.1 Duopoly
As a ﬁrst application we consider an industry with two proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms producing a
homogeneous good. Each ﬁrm i, i =1 ,2, has a strictly convex, increasing and diﬀerentiable
cost function ci(qi), where qi ≥ 0 is the quantity produced by ﬁrm i,a n dci(0) = 0. The
demand q for the good is given by the concave, decreasing and diﬀerentiable inverse demand
function p = P(q), saying that the total demand for the good equals the total production
q = q1 + q2 when the price p is equal to P(q). The proﬁt function of both ﬁrms depends
on the quantities produced by each of the ﬁrms and is for ﬁrm i given by
π
i(qi,q j)=qiP(qi + qj) − c
i(qi).
A well-known solution concept for this duopoly model is the non-cooperative Cournot-Nash
solution in which simultaneously each ﬁrm chooses an optimal quantity given the choice of
14the other ﬁrm. For given i =1 ,2, let qj ≥ 0 be the quantity chosen by ﬁrm j  = i. Then
the optimal reaction of ﬁrm i is the quantity solving the proﬁt maximization problem
max
qi≥0 qiP(qi + qj) − c
i(qi).
Let ri(qj) be the solution to this problem. Under the conditions stated above on the
demand and cost functions, the reaction functions ri :I R + → IR +, i =1 ,2, are well-deﬁned
and continuous. A pair (qN
1 ,qN






j ), for i,j =1 ,2,i  = j.
We also consider the Stackelberg leader-follower quantity competition game. In this
model one of the ﬁrms, called the follower, say ﬁrm j, responds with his optimal reaction
rj(qi) to the quantity qi set by the other ﬁrm, called the leader, ﬁrm i, i  = j. So, ﬁrm i’s






A pair of quantities (qi
1,q i
2) is a Stackelberg solution of the non-cooperative market game





i solves maxqi≥0 πi
S(qi).
Under the conditions on the demand and cost functions stated above, the proﬁt maximiza-
tion problem
max
q≥0 qP(q) − c
i(q)
of a monopolistic ﬁrm i has a unique solution, say qm
i . Let MCi :I R + → IR b e g i ve n by
MCi(qi)=
∂ci(qi)
∂qi , i.e. MCi(·) is the marginal cost function of ﬁrm i, i =1 ,2. We now
assume that also the following conditions hold.
(i) For both ﬁrms i =1 ,2, the Stackelberg leadership proﬁt function πi
S is strictly
concave in qi.
(ii) For both ﬁrms i =1 ,2, it holds that P(qm
i ) >MC j(0), j  = i.
The ﬁrst condition guarantees that there exists a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium, see
for instance Tirole [21], page 225-226. The second condition, saying that the market price
in case ﬁrm i operates as a monopolist is higher than the marginal cost of ﬁrm j  = i at
qj = 0, guarantees that at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium both ﬁrms are on the market,
i.e. qN
i > 0f o ri =1 ,2. Observe that in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium each player has a
15nonnegative proﬁt, because a ﬁrm always has the possibility to set its production equal to
zero, making proﬁt equal to zero. Furthermore, under the ﬁrst condition also the proﬁt
maximizing problem of the leader in the Stackelberg game has a unique solution.
We show ﬁrst that the Cournot-Nash model can be formulated as a socially struc-
tured NTU-game. There are two agents, so N = {1,2}. On the grand coalition of both
players, we consider two internal organizations. For ease of notation, let Ii, i =1 ,2, de-
note the internal organization of N in which player i follows the decision of player j  = i.
Further, let Ii denote the unique organization for player i himself, i =1 ,2. Then the
collection of feasible internal organizations is equal to I = {I1,I2,I 1,I 2}. Next, we deﬁne
the payoﬀ sets v(I)f o rI ∈I . The internal organization Ii, i =1 ,2, corresponds to the
case where the ﬁrms play the Stackelberg game with player j  = i as the leader and ﬁrm i as
the follower. We assign to this internal organization the set of payoﬀs that can be attained
when the other ﬁrm j produces an arbitrarily chosen quantity qj and ﬁrm i chooses his
optimal reaction qi = ri(qj)t oqj, i.e.
v(Ii)={x ∈ IR
2 |∃qj ≥ 0 such that xj ≤ π
j(qj,r
i(qj)),x i ≤ π
i(r
i(qj),q j)},i =1 ,2.
To deﬁne the sets v(Ij), j =1 ,2, we assume that ﬁrm j is aware that the other player i  = j
will never set a quantity above his optimal leadership quantity qi
i in the Stackelberg game.
Each ﬁrm can get at least the (low) payoﬀ to be realized as a follower in the Stackelberg










Since the proﬁts are bounded from above by the monopoly proﬁts and are closed and
comprehensive by deﬁnition, the conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 3.2 are satisﬁed.
As power vector function we take p(Ii)=e(i), i =1 ,2. For I1 and I2 we assume
that pi(Ii) <p j(Ii), i =1 ,2, j  = i, in order to express that player j as a leader has more
power than player i as a follower. From this power vector function it follows that there




2)= {x ∈ IR




j),i =1 ,2}⊂ v(I1) ∪ v(I2),
v(I1) ∩ v(I2) ⊂ v(I1) ∪ v(I2),
v(I
i) ∩ v(Ii)= {x ∈ IR




j)}∩v(Ii) ⊂ v(I1) ∪ v(I2),i =1 ,2,
it follows that any socially stable payoﬀ vector x is feasible for the grand coalition N.S o ,
the game is socially stable and thus satisﬁes also condition (iii) of Theorem 3.2. Since all
conditions of Theorem 3.2 are satisﬁed the game has a non-empty socially stable core.
Let x∗ =( x∗
1,x ∗
2)￿ be a payoﬀ vector in the socially stable core. Then there are
three possibilities. First, suppose x∗ is supported by the socially stable collection {I1,I2}.





j), i =1 ,2, i.e. each ﬁrm gets a payoﬀ at most
equal to his proﬁt he gets as follower in the Stackelberg game. This contradicts that x∗











1 ))￿ lies in v(I1)a sw e l la si nv(I2). Secondly, suppose x∗ is supported















































j and the payoﬀs are the Stackelberg leader-follower game payoﬀs with
player j as leader and player i as follower. However, then there exists a payoﬀ vector x in
the set v(Ij), with j  = i as the follower, that dominates x∗. To see this, observe that the
proﬁts of both players increase if player i continues to play ri(q
j
j)b u tp l a y e rj decreases his
quantity from q
j




j), yielding the payoﬀ vector











contradicts that x∗ cannot be improved upon. Therefore, any socially stable core element
is supported by the family (I1,I 2), i.e. x∗ ∈ v(Ii), i =1 ,2. Because x∗ ∈ v(I2)w eh a v eb y






































Since x∗ is economically stable we must have that all inequalities hold with equality and


























From the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium it follows that q∗
i = ri(q∗
j) and hence q∗
i = qN
i ,
i =1 ,2. So, the quantities supporting the unique payoﬀ vector in the socially stable core
are the Cournot-Nash quantities. This gives the following result.
17Result 5.1
The socially stable core of the socially structured duopoly game (N,I,v,p) with I =
{I1,I2,I 1,I 2} contains a unique element x∗. The corresponding quantities q∗
1 and q∗
2 form
the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the non-cooperative quantity competition game.
The result shows that the Cournot-Nash outcome of the non-cooperative game is supported
by the socially stable core outcome of an appropriately deﬁned socially structured game. In
fact, it should be noticed that the non-cooperative behavior is modeled by an appropriate
choice of the collection of feasible internal organizations and corresponding payoﬀ sets.
Next we consider the Stackelberg leader-follower quantity competition game. To





2) of the Stackelberg game with ﬁrm j being the leader, we take as the




with I1, I2 and Ii, i  = j, as deﬁned above. We take the same payoﬀ sets and power vectors
as above for the three elements of I, so that the game (N,I,v,p) satisﬁes the conditions (i)
and (ii) of Theorem 3.2. Clearly, the only minimal socially stable collections are {I1,I2}
and {Ii,Ii}. It follows as above that for both collections the intersection of the payoﬀ sets is
in v(Ii). Hence, the game is socially stable and thus also satisﬁes condition (iii) of Theorem
3.2. Therefore, the game has a non-empty socially stable core. By an analogously reasoning
as in the Cournot-Nash case it follows that any payoﬀ vector x∗ =( x∗
1,x ∗
2)￿ in the socially
stable core is supported by the socially stable collection {Ii,Ii}, so that x∗ ∈ v(Ii) ∩ v(Ii)









i  = j. Notice that, in contrast to the Cournot-Nash case, these payoﬀs cannot be improved
by a payoﬀ vector in v(Ij) by decreasing the quantity of the leader j because now Ij is
not in the collection I. So, the socially stable core contains a unique payoﬀ vector, whose
components are the Stackelberg leader-follower game payoﬀs with player j as leader and
player i as follower. This gives the following result.
Result 5.2
The socially stable core of the socially structured game Γ=( N,I,v,p) with I = {I1,I2,I i},
i ∈{ 1,2}, contains a unique element x∗. The corresponding quantities q∗
1 and q∗
2 form
the unique Stackelberg equilibrium for the non-cooperative quantity competition game with
player j being the leader and player i being the follower.
5.2 Games in Graph Structure
A special class of socially structured games is what we would like to call games in graph
structure, in which any admissible internal organization of a coalition is modeled by means
18of a (directed) graph. A graph G is deﬁned to be a pair (V,A), where V is a non-empty
ﬁnite set of elements, called the vertices of the graph, and A is a ﬁnite collection of ordered
pairs of elements of V, called the arcs of the graph. In our setup V is a subset S of the
grand coalition. Concerning A, two diﬀerent agents i,i￿ ∈ S have no direct organizational
relation in case both pairs (i,i￿) and (i￿,i) are not in A, i weakly dominates i￿ if the pair
(i,i￿) ∈ A,a n di dominates i￿ i ft h ep a i r( i,i￿) ∈ A and (i￿,i) / ∈ A. Although in principle
we do not impose any restriction on a graph G =( S,A), it is useful for the deﬁnition of
the power vector function to exclude for all i ∈ S the pairs (i,i)f r o mA.
Well-known examples of graph structures are the complete graph A = {(i,j)|i,j ∈
S, i  = j}, the empty graph A = ∅, a hierarchy (a graph that does not contain a directed
sequence of edges from a node to itself), or a tree (a graph that contains for one speciﬁc
node, the leader, a unique directed connected sequence of edges to any other node). If the
coalition S is able to generate payoﬀ to its members when organized according to the graph
G =( A,S), we call G feasible and denote the payoﬀ set by v(G). For any subset S of N,
the collection of all feasible graphs G with vertex set S is denoted by GS. The collection
of all feasible graphs G is obtained by taking the union of GS over all subsets S of N.T h e
payoﬀs are therefore determined by a mapping v from G to the collection of non-empty
subsets of I R
n satisfying that for every graph G ∈G S, the set v(G) ⊂ IR
n is cylindric with
respect to S.
To each feasible graph G =( S,A) a power vector p(G) is associated measuring the
power of the nodes within G. Because any internal organization of a coalition S is given
by a graph on S, we can use one of the power vector functions for graphs known from the
literature. To give some examples of proposed power vector functions, we deﬁne for i ∈ S
the sets of predecessors and successors of i by
P
i(G)={j ∈ S|(j,i) ∈ A} and D
i(G)={j ∈ S|(i,j) ∈ A},
respectively, i.e. Pi(G)i st h es e to fa l lp l a y e r sb yw h i c hi is weakly dominated in G
and Di(G) is the set of all players in G weakly dominated by i. A well-known method
in graph theory to measure the power of a player in a graph is the score index,s e ef o r
instance Behzad, Chartrand and Lesniak-Foster [3] or Rubinstein [18]. According to the
score index, the power of a player i ∈ S in the graph G =( S,A)i se q u a lt ot h en u m b e ro f
elements in the set Di(G), i.e. the number of players in S player i is dominating. Another
power index has been introduced by van den Brink [6], see also van den Brink and Gilles
[7], according to which the power of a player i in G is given by
￿
j∈Di(G)|Pj(G)|−1.T h e
interpretation of this dominance index is as follows. Initially, each player gets one point.
This point is equally distributed amongst all his predecessors, so amongst all the players
by which a player is weakly dominated. The power of a player is the sum of all his shares
in the points of the players he weakly dominates.
19Finally, we give the so-called positional power index introduced in Herings, van der
Laan and Talman [9]. While the score index of a player only depends on his number of
successors and the dominance index of a player on the number of predecessors of each of his
successors, the positional power of a player depends also on how powerful these successors










),i ∈ S. (3)
It means that a player gets a power of 1
n for each weakly dominated player plus a fraction
1
n of the power of that player. The power index of a player is higher if he weakly dominates
more powerful nodes. As shown in [9], the system (3) has a unique nonnegative nonzero
solution. We now take some power index for the power vector function p : G→IR
n, i.e. for
any graph G ∈Gon S, the powers (pi(G))i∈S are determined by a given power index for
nodes in graphs, for instance the positional power index. This gives the following deﬁnition
of a graph game.
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Graph Game)
A socially structured game in graph structure or graph game is given by the quadruple
Γ∗ =( N,G,v,p).
Social and economic stability are deﬁned as before, but with respect to G instead of I.
From Theorem 3.2 it follows that a graph game (N,G,v,p) has a non-empty socially stable
core if (i) the game is socially stable, (ii) for all i ∈ N, Gi =( {i},∅) ∈Gand v(Gi)=
{x ∈ IR
n|xi ≤ αi} for some αi ∈ I R, and (iii) for all S ⊂ N,e v e r ys e tv(G), G ∈G S,i s
comprehensive, closed and its individual rational points are bounded in I R
S.
As an example consider a ﬁrm that can be organized internally according to a tree
in several ways. Not all tree structures might be allowed, for instance because of legal
restrictions involved in the execution of certain tasks. Each feasible tree will generate
possible payoﬀs for the people that are located on the nodes of the tree. Typically, these
payoﬀ sets are closed (continuity), comprehensive (free disposal) and bounded from above
(ﬁnite proﬁts). Suppose that, except for the singletons (outside options), only trees are
feasible that involve all agents. Then it follows that either the proﬁts corresponding to
the outside options cannot be realized by any internal organization of the ﬁrm, in which
case the ﬁrm cannot survive, or the socially stable core is non-empty. When the socially
stable core is non-empty, there is a payoﬀ vector, at least as good as the outside option
vector, which cannot be improved upon by any other internal organization, and which is
supported by a graph balanced collection of internal organizations. Any tree on the whole
set of agents in this collection could be used to internally organize the ﬁrm. Notice that the
20balanced collection may contain one or more singletons, in which case the corresponding
agents do not get more than their outside option.
As a second example we consider a ﬁrm with a ﬁxed internal organization on N,
being a hierarchy (tree) given by a linear ordering on the set of players, i.e. the agents
can be numbered in such a way that the internal organization is given by the graph (N,A)
where A = {(i,i +1 )| i =1 ,...,n− 1}. We further suppose that a coalition can only
generate payoﬀs for themselves when they are connected in this graph (N,A). So, for
S ⊂ N, GS contains at most one element. When S = {j,j +1 ,...,k} for some j,k with
1 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ n, then GS = {(S,AS)} where AS = {(h,h +1 )| h = j,...,k− 1} is the
restriction of A to S, otherwise GS = ∅. For ease of notation, in the following we denote
a coalition of the form {j,j +1 ,...,k} by [j,k]. We further assume that for any graph
G =( [ j,k],A [j,k]) the power index p satisﬁes ph(G) >p h+1(G), h = j,...,k−1. This is for
instance the case when we take the positional power index. Since G only contains graphs of
the form ([j,k],A [j,k]), this implies that any socially stable collection of graphs must contain
a graph of the form ([h,k],A [h,k]) for any h ∈ N, i.e. any player h must be in a coalition
not containing players before h in the hierarchy. So, any payoﬀ vector x in the socially
stable core is sustained by a socially stable collection containing for any h ∈ N ag r a p h
([h,k],A [h,k]), for some k ≥ h. According to Corollary 4.2 it follows that when x is a payoﬀ
vector in the socially stable core, for any h ∈ N there is a coalition [h,k] such that x is
on the boundary of the payoﬀ set v(([h,k],A [h,k])). Within this setting, the socially stable
core selects a subset of the core such that at any payoﬀ vector in this subset any player h
gets only a share in the payoﬀ he can realize within some coalition [h,k], i.e. a coalition
containing some of its subsequent subordinates, but no superiors. So, within a ﬁrm with a
linearly ordered hierarchy all proﬁts that a player can realize in cooperation with superiors
is distributed amongst its superiors. The example shows that by using information on the
internal organization correctly, the framework of a socially structured game may provide
more precise predictions about the outcome of economic situations.
Finally we consider an example of a graph game with a ﬁxed internal organization
on N, being the complete graph (N,C), i.e. C = {(i,j) | i,j ∈ N, i  = j}. Suppose that
only the coalitions are able to generate payoﬀs by full cooperation, so for any S ⊂ N,
GS contains only the complete graph (S,CS). Within this framework we have a unique
internal organization for every coalition. Since any graph is complete, we have that for
every G =( S,CS) any power index p discussed before satisﬁes pi(G)=pj(G)f o ra l l
i,j ∈ S. Moreover, in this case the collection consisting only of the complete graph on the
grand coalition is socially stable. It follows that the socially stable core coincides with the
core.
216C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we have introduced socially structured games. The concept of socially struc-
tured games extends the standard NTU-game setting by taking into account the internal
organization of a coalition and the associated power of players in this internal organiza-
tion. We allow for several potential internal organizations of the same set of players, all
potentially leading to diﬀerent associated powers of the players involved.
We introduce the socially stable core as a reﬁnement of the core. For a payoﬀ to
be in the socially stable core, it has to be both socially and economically stable. Social
stability of a payoﬀ is related to a condition of equal power of the players involved in
internal organizations that are able to generate the payoﬀ. Excess power of certain players
will allow them to increase their payoﬀ at the expense of others, an unstable situation.
Economic stability reduces to the standard notion of the core. We have shown that the
socially stable core of a socially structured game is non-empty if the game satisﬁes the
condition of social stability, as well as some standard technical conditions. To prove this
result, we formulate a new intersection theorem, which is of independent interest. Since
the socially stable core reﬁnes the core, non-emptiness of the socially stable core implies
non-emptiness of the core.
Any socially structured game induces an NTU-game. Although any balanced NTU-
game induces a socially stable socially structured game, it is not necessarily the case that a
socially stable socially structured game leads to a balanced NTU-game for some balancing
weights. We have therefore shown that the additional structure of socially structured games
can be used to provide new conditions that are suﬃcient for non-emptiness of the core.
We conclude the paper with two applications. The ﬁrst application shows that the
modeling of a duopoly with Cournot competition as a socially structured game leads to a
socially stable core that coincides with the payoﬀs of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We
also consider a special class of socially structured games in more detail, the so-called graph
games. The literature provides a number of proposals to deﬁne the power of players, when
their internal organization is modeled as a graph. We derive a number of ﬁrst results
for graph games. Since the class of graph games is suﬃciently rich to encompass many
economic phenomena of interest, we believe it to be a nice candidate for further research.
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